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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

RICHARD JOSEPH GARCIA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20050272-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of two counts of Distributing or
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, to wit methamphetamine, a
Second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A.§ 58-37-8 . This court has jurisdiction
over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2A-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF
GUILTY?
PRESERVATION: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by the
timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea which was denied. (R.37-38)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court in the case of State v. Mora, (2003
Ut App 117 f 16) has held: "The 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a
right. . . [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.' State v. Gallegos,
738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Thus, '[w]e review a trial court's denial of a
1

motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard.' State v.
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any
violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a
felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree
felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third
degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was
used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the
commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence
2

the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room,
tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or
distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more
than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any
part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent
to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a onedegree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a
second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third
or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced
3

to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the
conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death
of another.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person
or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or
represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the
administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the
person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source,
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
4

(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued
or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing
designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the
foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D ~ Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section,
Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter
37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the
penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the
act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of
any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on
the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or
through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house,
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii);
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery,
or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the
grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty
that would otherwise have
5

been established but for this subsection would have been a first-degree felony.
Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is
not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted
under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who,
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or
indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as
described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the
same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course
of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing,
or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
6

(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary
course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or application.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 11(e)
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
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(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable,
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged in a two-count information filed November 1,
2004, with the offense of Distribution or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated §58-37-8.

On November 1, 2004, the Defendant made an initial

appearance and the information was read to him. On January 4, 2005, the
Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and was arraigned on the charge. At that
time the defendant entered into a plea negotiation in which he pled guilty to two
counts of distribution of a controlled substance a second-degree felony. The drug
8

free zone language was stricken as part of the negotiation and the prosecutor
agreed not to file another first-degree drug charge based on some illegal substances
found in the defendant's home.
The defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea and a hearing on
that motion was held on March 1, 2005, at which time the trial court, Judge Pamela
Heffernan denied the motion. On March 8, 2005, the Defendant was sentenced to
an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on both
charges. The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was filed on March 10, 2005.
The prison term was commenced that day.
The Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on March 18, 2005.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged in a two-count information with two counts of
Distribution or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free
Zone, a first-degree felony in violation of UCA §58-37-8. (R. 001) At the date set
for the preliminary hearing the defendant entered into a plea negotiation in which
the drug free zone language was stricken and the defendant pled guilty to two
second-degree felonies. As part of the negotiation the prosecutor agreed not to file
an additional first-degree felony charge. At the time of the plea, the defendant
executed a document entitled "statement of the defendant in support of a guilty
plea", which went through in detail all the Rule 11 issues(R. 21-26). The defendant
9

told the court that he had read the statement(R. 70 / 5) and that he understood that
he would "be giving up [his] rights to trial" (R. 70 / 5). The trial court told the
defendant that the statement "goes through in detail what your rights are,
including, as you said, your right to a trial and a right to be represented by a lawyer
at the trial, all the associated rights with that." (R. 70 / 5). The trial court also went
through the possible maximum sentence that could be imposed, and the defendant
stated in court that he was aware of these rights. (R. 70 / 5). The trial court
incorporated the statement in support of guilty plea into the record. (R. 7 0 / 5 ) The
defendant subsequently and timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea and on
March 1, 2005 a hearing was held on that motion.
At that hearing the defendant admitted that he had read "word for word" the
affidavit in support of a guilty plea (R. 70 / 13) and that he did not have any
question about that document.(R. 70/14) He testified that the Judge had asked him
if he had any questions about the plea and he told her that he did not have any
questions (R.70 / 14). He also stated that trial counsel did not force him to plead
guilty, but that he was coerced (R. 70/14)
The only contention that the defendant raised was that he believed that the
unfiled charge may have had some constitutional issues that were not raised by
trial counsel.(R. 70 / 16). The defendant did acknowledge that he received the
reduction of the charges from first degree to second degree (R. 70 /15).
10

The defendant's plea attorney Martin Gravis testified that he had gone over
issues with the defendant prior to his entering his plea. He testified that he believed
that since the two charged felonies were controlled buys that there would have
been no suppression issues to raise (R. 70 / 34). He testified that although there
may have been some issues on the search of the defendant's home, those issues
would apply only to the unfiled felony, and would be of no help to the two charged
felonies (R. 70 / 34). He also testified that he believed that the defendant knew and
understood what he was pleading guilty to and had no questions at the time of plea
(R. 70 / 34, 35).
After hearing the evidence at the hearing, Judge Heffeman ruled that the
defendant was represented by competent counsel(R. 7 0 / 4 1 ) and had knowingly
entered his plea (R. 70 / 42). She found that he had read and understood the plea
agreement and understood by pleading guilty he was giving up certain rights, and
that he received a benefit of the bargain (R. 70 / 42, 43). Based on those finding,
the court denied the defendant's motion (R. 70 / 43)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the trial court
improperly denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based upon
the Rule 11 colloquy conducted at the plea hearing, and based upon the fact that
the defendant executed and acknowledged reading and understanding the statement
11

in support of guilty plea document, the trial court properly followed the
requirements of Rule 11.
After having reviewed the case law together with all these factors, defense
counsel has been unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this
reason, this brief is being filed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d (Utah
1981).
ARGUMENT
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e) provides a guideline that a
trial court must follow in the taking of a plea of guilty. The application of this Rule
has been held by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to require strict
compliance. In the case of State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000)
the Court held:
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a
guilty plea is entered." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (quoting
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)). The trial court
must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d
371, 372 (Utah 1996). (emphasis added)
This "strict compliance" requirement replaced the former "substantial
compliance" requirement before a plea can be taken. (See State v. Thurman, 911
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) where the Court held, "Gibbons created a 'strict
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compliance' rule requiring that a trial court 'personally establish... that the
defendant... understood the elements of the crime'".)
The Rule 11 colloquy utilized during the taking of a plea of guilty must
establish this "strict compliance" for each element of the plea. Although the extent
of this strict compliance requirement has been recently reviewed by the Utah
Supreme Court in the cases of State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276 (Utah 2004) and State v.
Corwell, 114 P.3d 569 (Utah 2005), the requirement that the court taking a plea of
guilty remains one of strict compliance. In determining whether each of these Rule
11 requirements were appropriately adhered to in the case at bar it is necessary to
review each element in conjunction with the trial court's efforts at compliance.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e) provides " The court may
refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not
accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and crossexamine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea,
these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
13

would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if
it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and
if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the
court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the
statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a
plea, (emphasis added)
In the case at bar the defendant read and executed a statement in
support of a guilty plea, (see Addendum B) That document clearly addressed
each of the above elements of Rule 11 in great detail. The trial court asked
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the defendant if he understood his rights and the defendant told the court that
he had read the statement(R. 7 0 / 5 ) and that he understood that he would
"be giving up [his] rights to trial" (R. 70 / 5). The trial court then told the
defendant that the statement in support of guilty plea "goes through in detail
what your rights are, including, as you said, your right to a trial and a right to
be represented by a lawyer at the trial, all the associated rights with that." (R.
70 / 5).
The trial court then asked the prosecutor to recite a factual basis for
the plea which is as follows:
On October 20th, 2004, officers from NUCAT sent in a confidential
informant to purchase methamphetamine from the defendant. The
defendant sold the confidential [informant] methamphetamine. It
tested positive as meth. And then again on October 24th of 2004, they
did the same thing. Again, the confidential informant turned over
methamphetamine to the officers that tested positive. And the
defendant was later interviewed after the execution of the search
warrant on his home where additional narcotics were found inside the
home. The defendant at that time admitted that he had been
distributing drugs. (R. 70 / 7)
The trial court also went through the possible maximum sentence that could
be imposed, and the defendant stated in court that he was aware of these rights. (R.
70 / 5). The trial court incorporated the statement in support of guilty plea into the
record. (R. 70 / 5)
At a hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea the trial
court found that all Rule 11 requirements had been met, that the defendant knew
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and understood his rights at the time of the plea, and that the defendant had
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas.
The only issue the defendant wanted appealed, and under the circumstances,
the only issue the defendant could appeal, was the voluntariness of the entry of his
guilty plea. Since all the Rule 11 requirements were followed, and since the
defendant admitted in the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, that he
understood his rights there are no possible violations on which to appeal. For these
reasons, counsel respectfully requests permission to withdraw from further
representation of the defendant.
Counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
Defendant was been mailed a copy of this brief more than thirty days ago and has
responded to that request with a four page letter received at appellate counsel's
office on August 25, 2005. In that letter the defendant claims that he believed that
upon reviewing the discovery in his case he believed that there were several facts
that would "support a feasible jury trial". He then goes through some of these facts
in his letter concluding that he believes he would have a chance to win a jury trial
if the case were to go to trial.
The only claim that the defendant makes regarding a knowing and intelligent
entry of plea is a claim that he was "coerced by the prosecution with a separate five
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to live [first-degree felony]." He does not claim that he was under the influence of
any kind of drug or alcohol nor that he was not of a right mind or that the plea was
involuntary. His claim that the plea was coerced by a separate first-degree felony
charge was in fact part of the plea negotiation in which the State agreed not to file
a first-degree felony drug charge against the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this reason,
counsel respectfully requests this Court to release him as appellate counsel.
DATED t h i s / | day of September, 2005

Attjorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark
Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th
Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaicj this j 3 d a y of
September, 2005.
)/.•>..
1 1
/

^.Q41^Xrr
. :¥m«
ANDALL W. JUCHARDS
Attorney at Law
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ADDENDUM A

Randall W. Richards
Dee W. Smith

THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPELLATE DIVISION
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801)399-4191

FILE COPY

August 8, 2005
Richard Joseph Garcia
Inmate No. 21187
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Re:

SOU v. Richard Joseph Garcia

Dear Mr. Garcia,
I have been working on your appeal, and have done extensive research regarding your
complaint that the Judge should not have sentenced you to prison. I have not been able to find
any cases to support our position on this issue. The problem is that where you testified at the
hearing to withdraw your plea that you had read every word of the plea bargain agreement and
fully understood it, the Judge had no legal reason to allow your plea to be withdrawn. The fact
that you may have had a question about an illegal search in an unfiled case, does not rise to the
level required to withdraw a plea which would be that you did not knowingly enter the plea.
The Utah Appellate Courts will not change a judge's decision on this issue unless it is so
obvious that you did not know the rights you were giving up when you entered the plea.
I am filing a brief saying that I can find no issue for an appeal. I have enclosed a copy of
that brief for your inspection. If you have any other issues you would like discussed on
appeal, please bring them to my attention within 30 days of the date of this letter. If I do
not hear from you on further issues, I will submit the brief to the Court of Appeals unchanged.

Attorney at Law
RWR/mm
Enclosure

ADDENDUM B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

Case No. QLf

vs.

/fOCc^^

Judge
Defendant.
_, hereby acknowledge and certify that T have been
I,
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights;
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

A.

-2

DEGREE

?°

/OlS-/Y*£- r fW- c:H

PUNISHMENT
MIN/MAX AND/OR
MINIMUM MANDATORY

/A/S"

£*~

B.
C
D.

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty (or no contest).

n?i

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

XL

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes.) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do no dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
<>c: r

t*l*j\

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

^

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights:
COUNSEL: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I
might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me.
i^have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I
have doneWknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

n?2

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / / A , i / f ^ t Crg v- k \
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
JURY TRIAL, I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial

(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

I know that if I were to

have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) by attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call

witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs.
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

I know that if I

were to have a jury trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no on could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF.

I know that if I do not plead

guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge,
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that J am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

0°3

CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR N O CONTEST) PLEA

POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I
also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS.

I know that if there is more than one

crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime
that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)(is/are not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

A,y-S <> W^vcELM,- •. 1 ^ * ~-V*-«-r
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TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge
may do are not binding on the Judge.
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
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contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am J? I years of age. I have attended school through the / / Grade. I can read and
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I will be allowed to
withdraw my plea only if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after
sentencing for any reason.
DATED this

V

day of

J ^ w ^ . r ^
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ft>/w)/fflr^A
DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for
, the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

S

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

BARNO./^5/7
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against f\{CJl^ro
ffiApMol
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which
the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest

JflS^pfr

ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and base on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest)vi)lea(s) to the crime(s)
set forth in the Statement be accepted^nd entered.
J

rj?
DATED

this ^ \ day of
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ADDENDUM C

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041906083 FS

RICHARD JOSEPH GARCIA,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
March 8, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
roxanneb
Prosecutor: SANDRA CORP
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, PDA
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 10, 1970
Video
Tape Number:
H030805
Tape Count: 324

CHARGES

1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 2nd Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/04/2005 Guilty
2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 2nd Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/04/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by
Michael Bouwhuis. The Court proceeds with sentencing.
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Case No: 041906083
Date:
Mar 08, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The Court orders sentence imposed on each count to run concurrent
with each other.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends defendant receive credit for time served while
at the Weber County Jail.

Dated this

day of

^MELA Q6S HEFFERNAN
District Court Judge
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